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RELIGIOUS LAND USE-ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT BROADLY INTERPRETS

RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT OF

2000

TO LEAVE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

NEARLY POWERLESS TO ZONE

HOUSES OF WORSHIP
Kristin E. Kruse
HE Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
("RLUIPA") prohibits local governments from discriminating
against houses of worship in land use decisions and the exercise of
religious freedom by institutionalized persons.' The Eleventh Circuit2
broadly applied RLUIPA in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside,
when it found that Surfside, Florida, could not prohibit two synagogues
from locating in its downtown business district. 3 Congress passed
RLUIPA in an effort to reverse the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Boerne v. Flores,4 which held that the earlier Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") was unconstitutional because Congress exceeded its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 RLUIPA focused only on prohibiting religious discrimination by state and local governments in land use zoning, as well as institutionalized persons' religious exercise, by providing a narrower standard
for improper religious discrimination as compared to the language of
RFRA. The Eleventh Circuit not only upheld RLUIPA's constitutionality, but the court also gave such a broad reading to the language of the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
2. 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1295 (Feb. 22, 2005). The
Supreme Court recently ruled that the institutionalized persons portion of RLUIPA in
section 3(a) is constitutional under the Establishment Clause; however, it did not comment
on the land use section of RLUIPA. Cutter v. Wilkinson, No. 03-9877, 2005 WL 1262549
(U.S. May 31, 2005).
3. Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1218-20, 1243.

4. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
5. Id. at 536. RFRA prohibits any government entity from substantially burdening a
person's exercise of religion unless the government could demonstrate the burden was in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
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statute that, as a practical manner, nearly all zoning regulations for any
religious activity may now be forbidden.
The statutory tests for a violation of RLUIPA originated from a line of
Free Exercise Clause cases beginning in 1990.6 Before 1990, most courts
applied the strict scrutiny test of Sherbert v. Verner,7 a 1963 Supreme
Court decision that asked whether the law substantially burdened a religious practice and, if it did, whether the burden was justified by a compelling interest. But, the Court's decision in 1990 in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith eliminated the strict scrutiny
test for government action in some cases because the Court held that
"neutral law of general applicability" that only incidentally impacts the
practice of religion does not have to be subjected to a strict scrutiny test.8
Three years later, Congress passed RFRA to restore the Sherbert strict
scrutiny test and "to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government."9 However, City
of Boerne v. Flores held RFRA unconstitutional four years later. 10 In
response, Congress passed RLUIPA in 2000 to require state and local
government decisions to undergo a strict scrutiny test if they significantly
burden religion in the areas of land use and institutionalized persons."
In interpreting RLUIPA for the first time, the Eleventh Circuit considered the complaints of Surfside, a small beach town south of Miami
Beach with 4,300 residents. 12 Surfside divided the city into eight zoning
districts, with churches and synagogues zoned to the residential district
and prohibited in the two-block business district. 13 Surfside's primary
goals in writing the zoning ordinances were to create a strong tax base
and to protect the character and location of future land uses. 14 The city
also required churches and synagogues to obtain a conditional use permit.' 5 Midrash Sephardi and Young Israel, two orthodox synagogues,
had about 100 members who lived in or around Surfside. 16 Midrash
leased the second floor of a bank in the business district to hold ser6. See Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 323-24 (2003)
(providing explanatory background of RLUIPA).
7. 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (holding that denial of unemployment benefits to a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, who quit her job rather than work on Sabbath
Day violated the Free Exercise Clause).
8. 494 U.S. 872, 879, 882-85 (1990).
9. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1997) (quoting RFRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(b) (1993)).
10. Id. at 536.
11.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

1217 (2d

ed. 2002).
12. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 2004).
13. SURFSIDE, FLA. CODE §§ 90-41(b)(1), 90-147(d), 90-152(a)-(e).
14. Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1221-22.
15. Surfside required conditional use permits when the use was public or semi-public
in nature and when the nature of the land use might impact neighboring property. SuRFSIDE, FLA. CODE § 90-41(d).
16. Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1219.
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vices. 17 Surfside denied Midrash's applications for a special use permit
and zoning variance because the congregation did not provide written
permission from the bank. 18 Young Israel leased a space in a hotel in the
tourist district, but it failed to apply for a conditional use permit or zoning
variance.19
Because followers of Orthodox Judaism are not allowed to use any
form of transportation on their Sabbath, they must walk to the synagogue
to attend weekly services.20 The synagogues claimed that the residential
district is too far for many members to walk from their homes.2 1 Surfside
argued that the zoning requirements limiting churches and synagogues to
the residential district would maintain city revenue by providing a strong
tax base in the business district.22 This disagreement led to the filing of
the lawsuit.
Surfside initially sued Midrash and New Israel in state court in 1999 to
end their use of the sites in the business district and to enforce penalties
for alleged violations of the Surfside Code; however, the lawsuits were
23
eventually removed to federal court and dismissed without prejudice.
Midrash and New Israel then filed suit in federal court for declaratory
and injunctive relief from the ordinances under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to
which Surfside counterclaimed to enforce its zoning regulation.2 4 To support its motion for summary judgment, Surfside presented evidence from
land use experts that the presence of churches and synagogues in the business district would decrease Surfside's tax base, while the synagogues
submitted evidence regarding their activities and the burden on their
members in moving to the residential district.2 5 The district court granted
summary judgment for Surfside reasoning that under the Smith test the
city code was neutral and of general applicability and therefore did not
have to be justified by a compelling government interest.2 6 Furthermore,
the district court held that the statute inflicted at most a minimal burden
on the plaintiffs, and there was no evidence of religious animus on the
part of Surfside in passing the zoning ordinance. 27 The synagogues filed
an amended complaint in November 2000, a month after RLUIPA went
the district court again
into effect, with a RLUIPA-based claim, and 28
granted summary judgment in favor of Surfside.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and held in
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
LEXIS
Res. v.
27.
28.

Id. at 1220.
Id.
Id. at 1220-21.
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id.at 1221-22.
Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id.
Midrash Sephardi et. al. v. Town of Surfside, No. 9901566-CIV, 2000 U.S. Dist.
22629, at *21-22 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 13, 2000) (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)); see also supra text accompanying note 6.
Midrash Sephardi et al., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22629, at *26.
Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1222.
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favor of the synagogues. 29 In interpreting RLUIPA, the appeals court
focused on two provisions: section (a)(1), the "substantial burden" provision, and section (b)(1), the "equal terms" provision. 30 The "substantial
burden" provision provides:
General Rule-No government shall impose or implement a land
use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the
burden on that person, assembly, or institution(A) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling gov31
ernmental interest.
The Eleventh Circuit first recognized that the zoning regulations imposed
no "substantial burden" on the synagogues. 32 The court explained that
prior case law teaches that zoning regulations do not impose a substantial
burden on religious exercise. 33 The court, however, distinguished these
cases from RLUIPA by noting the difference in the definition of "religious exercise," which the prior case law defined as something "integral to
a believer's faith."' 34 In contrast, RLUIPA provides a broader definition
of religious exercise that includes "use, building, or conversion of real
property for the purpose of religious exercise." '35 Based on the RLUIPA
definition, the court focused on whether the zoning regulations inflicted a
substantial burden on the "congregations' use of real property for the
purpose of religious exercise."' 36 The Eleventh Circuit chose to define a
substantial burden as that which "place[s] more than an inconvenience on
religious exercise" and is "akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly."' 37 Based on this definition, the court concluded that the
29. Id. at 1219.
30. Id. at 1225.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). RLUIPA defines "land use
regulation" as a "zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or
restricts a claimant's use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if
the claimant has ... [a] leasehold . . . in the regulated land or a contract or option to
acquire such an interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc 5(5) (2000).
32. Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1228.
33. Id. at 1225-26 (citing Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 739 (11th Cir.
1983) (holding that city's zoning law "[did] not prohibit religious conduct per se"); Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that city's church permit requirement only created a burden of "convenience and
expense"); Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 824-25 (10th Cir.
1988) (holding that there was no evidence that building a church on the particular site was
"intimately related to the religious tenets of the church")).
34. Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1226.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B) (2000).
36. Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1226.
37. Id. at 1227. The Eleventh Circuit declined to follow the Seventh Circuit's recent
definition of "substantial burden" as "one that necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise . . . effectively impracticable."
Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v.
City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003)).
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synagogues suffered no significant religious burden. There was no indication that the location in the business district had specific religious signifimay be burdensome, the
cance, and while walking a greater distance
38
burden.
substantial
a
not
was
court held it
The synagogues fared better on their challenge under the "equal
terms" provision in section (b)(1), which provides that "[n]o government
shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a
religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution. ' 39 Most importantly, the Eleventh Circuit
treated the substantial burden provision as operating independently from
the equal terms provision. 4 0 In other words, regardless of whether the
zoning ordinance imposed a substantial burden on the religious assembly,
the ordinance could still violate the equal terms provision of RLUIPA.
Moreover, the court reasoned that although section (b)(1) "has the 'feel'
of an equal protection law, it lacks the 'similarly situated' requirement
usually found in equal protection analysis. '4 1 The district court applied
similarly situated analysis and held that "private clubs and other secular
institutions are not similarly situated to churches and synagogues because
'private clubs provide more of a social setting and provide more synergy
for the shopping district."' 42 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit, compared
the dictionary definitions for "assembly," "institution," "church," and
"synagogue." Based on the definitions, the court concluded that
churches, synagogues, and private clubs are all within the "natural perimeter" of an "assembly or institution. '4 3 By finding houses of worship
within the "natural perimeter" of private clubs, the court then easily
found that any difference in treatment among all the facilities in this expansive definition constituted discrimination and was a violation of section (b)(1). 44
The Eleventh Circuit recognized, however, that an ordinance violating
RLUIPA's equal terms provision must undergo a strict scrutiny test to
determine whether the ordinance was narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling interest of the local government. 45 In doing so, the court rejected Surfside's request to apply rational basis review, which would have
38. Id. at 1228. Deposition testimony in the record indicated that those who practice
Orthodox Judaism usually move where synagogues are located and do not expect the synagogues to move closer to them. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
40. Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1229.
41. Id. at 1229 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50
(1985) (establishing similarly situated analysis of comparing land uses in an equal protection case and applying rational basis review)).
42. Id. at 1230 (citing Midrash Sephardi et al. v. Town of Surfside, No. 99-1566-CIV,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22629, at *17 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 13, 2000)).
43. Id. at 1230-31 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (explaining "[t]he critical question is whether the circumference of legislation
encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions could be
thought to fall within the natural perimeter.")).
44. Id. at 1231.
45. Id. at 1232.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

considered whether the law was rationally related to a legitimate purpose
of Surfside's government. 46 In applying its interpretation of RLUIPA
strict scrutiny review, the court explained that RLUIPA allows courts to
decide whether classifications used by local government "subtly or covertly
depart from requirements of neutrality and general applicability."' 4 7 Upon review of the Surfside zoning law, the court concluded that
the law violated the equal terms provision by not being neutral and generally applicable, therefore targeting religious groups and violating the
free exercise requirement of "neutrality and general applicability. '48 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that Surfside did not offer any evidence demonstrating that private clubs contribute to the business district any differ49
ently than religious institutions.
Even assuming that the statute is constitutional, the Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning is a warning to any city that it must carefully consider its zoning
decisions to avoid a violation of the equal terms provision of RLUIPA.
In Midrash, even without any evidence of religious animus or substantial
burden on a religious group, Surfside was found in violation of
RLUIPA.5 0
The Eleventh Circuit reached its conclusion through a strained interpretation of two provisions. First, the court incorrectly applied a "natural
perimeter" standard in its equal terms provision analysis, which does not
reflect traditional equal protection constitutional principles, and is not
specified in RLUIPA. City of Boerne explained that when Congress codifies constitutional principles, it cannot substantively change them. 5 1 The
traditional equal protection analysis for challenges to zoning laws is the
Cleburne "similarly situated" analysis of comparing the land uses, and if
they are treated differently, there must be a rational basis for the difference. 52 But the Eleventh Circuit applied "natural perimeter" analysis,
instead of the Cleburne "similarly situated" analysis, by examining only
whether the two land uses of houses of worship versus businesses and
private clubs fell into the "natural perimeter" of each other.53 This analysis presents problems because it allows courts to include land uses as being in the "natural perimeter" of each other that would not be considered
"similarly situated" under Cleburne. Churches and synagogues under the
court's analysis, for example, would be in the "natural perimeter" of theaters, stadiums, restaurants, and bars, which are all land uses where people
can congregate. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's application of its "natural
perimeter" test makes it almost impossible for any city to zone houses of
worship since people can gather almost anywhere. Furthermore, it at46. Id. at 1231.
47. Id. at 1232.
48. Id. at 1233.
49. Id. at 1234.
50. See id. at 1235.
51. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
52. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50 (1985) (discussing
the similarly situated standard).
53. Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1230.
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taches to RLUIPA a test that rejects the established equal protection
analysis of Cleburne, and creates, in essence, a new constitutional test for
54
equal protection contrary to the reasoning of City of Boerne.
Second, the court incorrectly interpreted RLUIPA by ignoring the
need to prove a substantial burden before considering the equal terms
provision. By interpreting the statute's section (a) "substantial burden"
provision and section (b)(1) "equal terms" provision as separate causes of
action, a plaintiff does not have to show a substantial burden on religious
exercise to prove an "equal terms" violation under section (b)(1). 55 But
Senators Hatch and Kennedy, co-authors of RLUIPA, explained during
Senate hearings that sections (b)(1) and (2) "enforce the Free Exercise
Clause rule against laws that burden religion and are not neutral and generally applicable" and that "the party asserting a violation of this Act
shall in all cases bear the burden of proof that the governmental action in
question constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise."' 56 Furthermore, as support for its position, the Eleventh Circuit cited dicta from
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago,57 that the section
(a)(1) "substantial burden" provision and section (b)(2) "nondiscrimination" provision are independent of one another. 58 But the Seventh Circuit did not analyze the legislative history in drawing its conclusion. Most
importantly, the language of the statute supports the application of the
substantial burden test to the equal terms provision. In particular, the
language of the government discretion provision in section 3(e) indicates
that the statute's requirements must be read together by providing that "a
government may avoid the preemptive force of any provision of
[RLUIPA] by changing the policy or practice that results in a substantial
burden on religious exercise . . . .-59 This provision, which allows city
governments to correct regulations that are a substantial burden and
avoid "any provision" of RLUIPA, further indicates Congress's intent
that a substantial burden must be found for an equal terms violation. In
short, the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation conflicts with the statutory
language and the legislative history and erroneously broadens the application of RLUIPA by allowing religious institutions that otherwise would
not have a cause of action to bring suits under RLUIPA's "equal terms"
provision.
54. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
55. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1229.
56. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-76 (daily ed. Jul. 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch
and Kennedy).
57. 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding in favor of the city and affirming the
validity of a zoning ordinance under RLUIPA's governmental discretion provision, which
allows a city to avoid a RLUIPA violation if it changes the provision causing the substantial burden). The section (b)(2) nondiscrimination provision referred to in Civil Liberties is
not at issue in the Midrash case.
58. Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1227.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc3(e). The Seventh Circuit in Civil Liberties, the very case the
Eleventh Circuit relied on to support its separate analysis of the provisions, acknowledged
that the governmental discretion provision "appears not to reflect this distinction," which
supports reading the two provisions together. 342 F.3d at 762.

472

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

Apart from whether RLUIPA meets the constitutional tests, cities are
still faced with the interpretation of its statutory language. Based on the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Midrash, local governments must now consider whether it is even possible to zone to exclude houses of worship
from any area of a city.

